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1.  ISSC COMMITTEE V.1: DAMAGE ASSESSMENT FOLLOWING ACCIDENTS 
1.1 Official Discussion by Preben Terndrup Pedersen (DTU, Denmark) 
1.1.1 Introduction 
It is a pleasure to have been given the opportunity to serve as official discusser of 
the report of Committee V.1. As a long time member ISSC, I have been paying great 
interest into the efforts of ISSC committees in digesting new research results and 
presenting future directions for research and development of our fields of interest to 
the benefit of the maritime industry. 
 
According to the mandate Committee V.1 should deal with assessment of risk 
associated with damage, range of repair required and the effects of temporary 
repairs and mitigating actions following the damage.   
 
The report covers a wide range of hazards which can lead to structural damage, i.e. 
hydrocarbon explosions and fires, wave impact, water-in-deck, dropped objects, ship 
impacts, earthquakes, abnormal environmental actions and possible illegal activities 
like the use of explosives and projectiles. 
 
With the mandate as background the committee decided that the focus of the report 
should be on: 
 
1. Safety measures to be taken during the design phase and in case of 
accidents.  
2. Assessment of the level of damage and of the residual strength of the 
structure.  
 
To give a complete review of the advancements within these areas is a tremendous 
task and since this is the first ISSC committee to deal with these topics the 
committee has been forced to prioritize the topics to be included. As the committee 
will see there are only a few points where I disagree with the committee but there 
are a number of items where I would like to see further work to be done.  
   
In addition to the review of published work the committee must be commended for 
carrying out a benchmark study concerning the response of stiffened plates 
subjected to hydrocarbon explosions. 
 
 
1.1.2 General remarks 
 
1.1.2.1 Safety measures to be taken during the design phase  
 
Risk analysis is a tool that is increasingly applied during the design phase in the 
marine and offshore industries to manage safety, health and environmental 
protection. For rational design of safety measures it is important to apply a 
comprehensive risk analysis, i.e. to estimate accident frequencies and to determine 
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the probabilistic distributions of accidental loads given a specific hazard in order to 
perform rational consequence analyses. 
1.1.2.1.1 Probability of Occurrence 
 All the accidental damages considered by the committee are low probability, high 
consequence events. For this reason it is a challenge to develop procedures to 
estimate frequencies for the hazards such as those presented in the committee 
report.  
 
TABLE 1  
APPROACHES FOR DETERMINING INCIDENT OCCURRENCE FREQUENCIES (FROM OMAE 2007-29760) 
Approach Main Advantages Main Disadvantages 
Statistics of incidents Long been regarded as the only 
reliable sources 
Limitation with incident reports, 
difficulty in application to the future 
Expert opinions Long been used when limited 
by data 
Subjective 
Predictive calculations Predict unfavorable conditions, 
inexpensive 
Targets known scenarios, limits choice 
of software/programs, restricted to 
occurrence probability 
Comprehensive risk 
analysis 
Rational, includes consequences Relies on accident data for 
benchmarking 
 
From Table 1 it is seen that most of the structural analysis tools presented in the 
report can be considered as elements of comprehensive risk analysis procedures. 
 
Except for the section on hydrocarbon explosions and fires the report gives very 
limited information on procedures for estimation of the probability of the different 
hazards and the load distributions given a hazard takes place. If this reflects the 
scarcity of research work in this area there are good reasons to recommend such 
work in the future.   
 
1.1.2.1.2 Risk Control Options 
The consequences of the hazards considered by Committee V.1 can be measured 
in terms of structural damage, the number of fatalities and injuries, the amount of 
material released to sea, the immediate impact on environmental resources, and the 
subsequent costs of restoration. An important part of a safety design procedures is 
to reduce these consequences by considering risk minimizing measures or Risk 
Control Options (RCOs). That is, to include a combination of actions that reduces the 
frequency and consequences of accidents. Those assessing the risk normally 
prioritize Risk Control Options that are adopted to reduce the number of hazardous 
situations that may cause an accident. On the other hand, because the consequences 
of incidents are so serious for offshore structures, we must develop damage tolerant 
structural designs and develop consequence reducing arrangements, regulations and 
requirements.  
 
The tools presented in the report are essential elements for analysis of damage 
tolerant structures. Future committee work could preferably also give attention to 
consequence reduction, i.e. possible RCOs for the different hazards.  
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1.1.2.1.3 Rules and Regulations   
Most design codes reflect a number of distinctive risk assessment steps in the design 
process. For instance API Recommended Practice 2A-WSD specifies the following 
assessment tasks for evaluating the events (fire, blast, and accidental loading) that 
could occur to a platform over its intended service life and service function(s): 
• Task 1, assign a platform exposure category for the platform 
• Task 2, assign risk levels to the probability of the event 
• Task 3, determine the appropriate level of risk for the selected platform and 
event 
• Task 4, conduct further study or analyses to better define the risk, 
consequence and cost of mitigation 
• Task 5, reassign a platform exposure category and/or mitigate the risk or the 
consequence of the event 
• Task 6, assess structural integrity if the platform is considered high-risk 
 
In Section 15 “Design and Assessment Process” the committee has a section on 
Codes and Standards. For designers this is an important subject. A number of codes 
are mentioned. But no systematic listing of relevant codes is presented. For instance 
the above mentioned API code is not included in section 15.2 even if this code is 
often used in the industry. 
 
Perhaps the report could have summarized relevant codes in a tabular form to the 
benefit of designers.   
 
It is my experience that for a consistent design process for safety it is of 
considerable value in a formal way to go through steps such as those from API 
presented above in order to document the procedure and to make a risk summary. A 
similar approach has been taken by IMO’s Formal Safety Assessment procedure for 
evaluation of proposed new regulations. See Fig.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1. IMO’s Procedure for Formal Safety Assessment 
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1.1.2.2 Assessment of the level of damage and of the residual strength of the structure 
 
When an emergency has happened on a platform the crew is often overwhelmed 
by tasks. There is little time and not often the expertise available to produce a 
residual strength assessment and safety evaluation onboard the platform. 
 
For commercial vessels the concept of “Emergency Response Service” has been 
established to provide fact based assistance to a vessel in distress immediately after 
an incident. 
  
Has Committee V.1 any thoughts about the use of the tools and procedures 
presented in the committee report to be applied  as integral parts of a similar 
Response Emergency Service for offshore platforms to assess the level of damage 
and the residual strength of structures given an incident has happened?  
 
After these more general remarks some comments will be offered to the sections 
on the specific hazards considered by Committee V.1. 
 
 
 
1.1.3 Hydrocarbon Explosions and Hydrocarbon Fires 
 
These two sections of the committee report focus on hazards involving sudden loss 
of containment, fires, explosions, or combinations thereof.  Even though the 
theoretical foundation for the physical and chemical processes involved is reasonably 
well established, then the complexity of realistic offshore problems limits direct use 
of basic theory for predicting the outcome of potential accidents. Practical 
engineering solutions rely on empirical correlations or phenomenological models. The 
current up to date procedures are based on the use of computational methods for 
evaluating the relevant partial differential equations in the form of algebraic 
equations. However, caution should be exercised whenever computational (CFD) 
models are used outside their validation range. There are not many large-scale 
experiments suitable for model validation, and the quality of the available 
measurements varies significantly. Furthermore, the repeatability of large-scale 
experiments is rarely investigated. There is a need for further research within this 
important area. 
 
It is obvious that design explosion loads derived from the worst credible event is 
far too large to be accommodated by any structure. Thus the focus of these sections 
has been on comprehensive risk based approaches as mentioned in the last lines of 
Table. 1. Nearly all elements are touched upon. Quantitative risk assessments of the 
risk associated with hydrocarbon explosions and fire are still in its infancy and as the 
committee points out different analysts will often come to quite different estimates. 
But a thorough and critical review of the latest literature as presented here will help 
to standardize risk analyses in this area.  
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These two sections of the committee report give excellent reviews of current 
knowledge and are of value for designers of offshore structures. They give a good 
introduction to the physics of the problems where the different structural load 
mechanisms are described. Based on an overview of recent research, a probabilistic 
explosion risk model is presented together with design exceedance curves for 
overpressure. In these two sections the committee has managed to give a lot of 
information in a limited number of pages.  
 
 
The only topic I could miss is a description of possible risk control options. But 
this could be a good topic to be included in a future committee report. 
   
 
1.1.4 Underwater explosions, illegal activities like use of explosions and projectiles. 
It is not clear to me why Section 5 “Underwater Explosions” and Section 14 “Illegal 
Activities like use of Explosives and Projectiles” have not been combined. From a 
structural point of view these subjects are closely related. 
 
The source of underwater explosions is often the result of acts of terrorism. For 
this reason it is of course difficult to make any probabilistic predictions on 
frequencies and load distributions.  
 
The committee has chosen to describe different procedures to determine the 
structural response associated with different given underwater explosions. 
Unfortunately, most of the research results within this field are probably not 
available in the open published literature.  
 
Design against structural damage due to underwater explosions could be a 
subject for further work by the committee. The analysis procedures reviewed by the 
committee have in the past been used to improve the failure resistance of 
underwater structures. For instance, after the USS Cole incident, research was 
initiated to find structural configurations which can sustain higher underwater 
explosion loads. Some of this literature has been published and the results can 
probably be used to design more explosion resistant structures. 
 
 
1.1.5 Wave Impact, Wave-in- Deck, Freak waves and Tsunamis   
Wave impacts and slamming loads at the underside of superstructures is different 
from the other hazards treated by the committee. These loads and their effects are 
considered in the normal design process for fatigue limit loads as well as for 
serviceability load effects. They are not normally considered as accidental loads. I 
assume that one of the reasons why the ISSC standing committee has included 
these subjects in the mandate has been to look for procedures for assessment of the 
residual strength of offshore structures subjected to damage from these loads and/or 
some guidance for emergence response for consequences of these load types. 
   
Again it is not clear to me why Section 6 “Wave Impacts” and Section 11 
“Abnormal Environmental Actions” have not been combined to one section. 
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1.1.6 Dropped Objects and Ship Impact on Offshore Structures 
Together with hydrocarbon explosions and fire, ship collisions are among the 
most costly accidental loads. As stated in section 9.1 the offshore industry has a risk 
management concept for these accidental loads. For this reason it would be helpful 
for designers to get guidance for generation of an absorbed energy spectrum that 
shows the cumulative collision frequencies versus the impact energy generated by 
the collision. Such load and energy distributions are needed for rational consequence 
calculations. Again it does not seem reasonable to base the design against dropped 
objects and ship collisions on some deterministic worst case scenarios. 
 
The probability of the occurrence of impacts due to dropped objects and collisions 
may be computed from historical data, expert opinions and predictive calculations as 
indicated in Table 1. Historical data provide realistic figures which nevertheless are 
difficult to use for future predictions since they are not relevant to offshore 
structures which may differ from those used today and they do not take into account 
the actual geographical location, the operational procedures, new navigational 
equipment, etc. For these reasons mathematical models for prediction of the 
frequency of hazard occurrence is an important first step for a rational risk 
assessment procedure for impact loads. Such probabilistic analyses must involve 
identification of a number of different impact scenarios, each one associated with a 
probability level. A number of frequency prediction models have been developed 
during recent years which together with external energy analyses can be used to 
determine probabilistic distributions of energy released for crushing of structures. 
The final step in that part of the risk analysis is then to determine the consequences 
given that an event takes place. 
 
The focus of these two sections of the committee report is on analyses of 
consequences given that a well described impact incident has taken place. The 
Committee mainly concentrates on explicit FE-methods for consequence assessment 
of the large number of possible scenarios related to high energy impacts and 
structural configurations.  
 
In addition the committee recommends basing the consequence calculations on 
an integrated approach where the external mechanics of the impacting ship (or 
dropped object) is solved together with the structural response analysis.  
 
For comprehensive risk based analyses of damages to be expected due to ship 
impact I am not so sure that nonlinear explicit FEM simulations using coupled fluid 
dynamics always should be preferred. Even if significant progress in software and 
hardware has been made it seems to be an unattainable task to get the statistical 
consequence distributions needed for a risk based procedure by these coupled 
procedures. The loss of accuracy by separating collision problems into an external 
dynamic analysis and an internal analysis is normally quite small. The statement in 
Section 9.2 that in ship collisions mooring can give different external mechanics 
characteristics does not correspond to my experience.  
 
Of course, for specific analyses of accidents that have taken place the proposed 
advanced analysis procedures are very relevant.   
 
For future committee work within this area it is recommended that the committee 
reviews risk based assessment approaches which makes it possible also to evaluate 
risk control options in the form of increased crashworthiness of offshore structures. 
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1.1.7 Flooding 
The report includes a section on the effect of flooding on the structural integrity of a 
ship or a floating offshore structure.  
 
Mitigation of the further consequences of ship-ship impacts is to day usually achieved 
by controlled flooding, i.e. through defining a certain distance between inner and 
outer watertight barriers, defining appropriate subdivisions for survival in case of 
flooding, appropriate arrangement of cargo and fuel tanks etc.  
 
Two effects of flooding are considered in the committee report:  
 
The first is the global effect on the hull girder. Here Fig. 11 in the report shows the 
RAO for torsional moments of an intact and a damaged ship in beam waves. The 
choice to include this figure is somewhat surprising since hull girder torsional 
moments in FPSOs and other ship shaped offshore structures usually play a very 
small role for the overall stress level. It may have been of more interest to see 
similar curves for longitudinal bending moments and shear loads, even if analyses 
show that flooding does not normally increase the wave-induced hull girder sectional 
forces. 
 
The second effect considered is sloshing loads in flooded compartments. This load 
type is similar to the sloshing loads from liquid cargoes. The latter may be of more 
concern due to the more frequent partial filling ratio conditions during normal 
operation. 
 
 
1.1.8 Material Models for Structural Analysis 
When Benchmark Testing and Joint Industry Projects involving advanced 
structural analyses are carried out then it is quite often found that the results deviate 
considerably and can fail to model the physical tests in a reasonable way. One 
reason for these poor results can be the material models used for the numerical 
calculations. 
 
For this reason the committee must be congratulated for including a quite 
comprehensive section on material models. 
 
The committee first gives a review of existing guidelines and standards. It is 
shown that these existing guidelines fail to provide clear guidance for material 
modeling to the analysts.  
 
This section of the Committee Report is then followed up by a thorough 
discussion of properties for relevant materials such as steel, aluminum, foam, 
rubber, ice, air water, explosives, composites, soil, etc. The report even contains 
example input cards for the recommended material properties to a commonly used 
explicit finite element program. A section like this is new for ISSC, and I am sure 
that this will be used by structural analysts in the future.   
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1.1.9 Benchmark study: Stiffened panel subjected to explosion loads 
The committee has performed a valuable benchmark study where calculated 
structural response results are compared for a stiffened steel panel subjected to 
explosions loads using different numerical procedures. The benchmark is based on a 
full scale test experiment subjected to a hydrocarbon explosion load. The time 
variation of the deflections and the permanent plastic deformation of the panel are 
measured and numerically predicted by five different participants.  
 
The benchmark study is very illustrative. It shows that even if the panel and the 
physical set-up is quite simple and the test conditions are such that fracture has 
been avoided there is a considerable scatter in the results.  
 
Adding to this spread in structural response results also the uncertainty in 
explosion load prediction in the current design process then it is obvious that much 
more work is needed before reliable procedures for damage assessment of offshore 
structures subjected to explosions hazards is a mature field. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1.10 Closure 
Accidental loads on offshore structures cause loss of lives, economic losses, 
environmental damages and other unwanted events every year. It is indispensable 
that such hazards are considered to be so rare that the benefit of the operations to 
the owner and the public exceeds their sensitivity to risk. Therefore, one of the many 
performance goals during the design phase of offshore structures should be to 
ensure that serious accidents and service disruptions are low enough to be 
acceptable to all stakeholders, i.e. owners, the public and those responsible for 
public safety. On the other hand, the required risk levels should still allow 
construction and operation of these structures at feasible cost levels. To obtain this 
equilibrium structural damage assessment following accidents is an integral part of 
any risk assessment and serves to evaluate consequences of different hazards. 
 
That is, the procedures and tools reviewed by Committee V.1 are essential tools for 
balanced design against hazards and for estimation of survivability after incidents 
have taken place.  
 
The committee must be commended for presentation of a very valuable overview of 
different hazards for fixed and floating platforms, an excellent review of design 
principles for hydrocarbon fires and explosions, a new and rather complete material 
model database, and a benchmark study of the response of a strength element 
subjected to explosion loads.  
 
Hopefully the Standing Committee decides to continue this committee for another 
three year period. During a coming term the committee will have a chance to place 
more focus on procedures to estimate the probabilities for the different hazards, to 
probabilistic distributions of the associated accidental loads, to recommend Risk 
Control Options for the different hazards, to give a schematic overview of current 
regulations and recommendations, and to include a final section which gives advice 
on needed future research and development to improve safety. 
